The Cases for Military Modernisation in South America
South America is often deemed as the region with lagged defence refurbishment. In 2020, the region committed no more than US$ 50 billion to develop the defence sector. The main factors are the prolonging economic crisis, recurring political instability, and absence of geostrategic commitment.
The sinking of ARA San Juan (S-42) in the South Atlantic on November 17, 2017, inflicted a debate regarding the Argentine Navy’s readiness. This TR-1700 class submarine — built by the German marine industry ThyssenKrupp — remains in service more than 30 years after its commission, as the Fuerzas Armadas de la República Argentina — the Argentine Armed Forces — is struggling to keep the readiness of its assets. The Argentine Navy has only two submarines, and neither is operational due to the lack of maintenance and spare parts. To date, the navy only has 38 commissioned vessels, including three 40-years German-built active frigates (classified as destroyers) of the Almirante Brown-class. This daring situation creates more challenges to guarding the country’s 1,15 million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Apart, the Argentine Air Force is also struggling to upscale its fighting capability. Currently, the air force of this second-largest country in South America has 23 units of A-4AR Fighting Hawk purchased from the United States in 1997 in a US$ 282 million deal. As cited by Aerotime Hub, only six A-4ARs are combat-capable. Argentina has faced an embargo from the United Kingdom since the Falkland War and a financial crisis since the 2010s. The clear evidence is the rejection by the South Korean Government regarding Buenos Aires’ intention to purchase KAI FA-50 Golden Eagle in 2019, as the aircraft contains various British components. While Buenos Aires put the Chinese JF-17 Thunder as a replacement, there are currently no further deals on the acquisition. Although the Alberto Fernandez government has requested US$ 664 million, the deal process might have been capsized by the financial pressure due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Besides Argentina, the Military of Peru faces the same challenges. The London-based think-tank, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), cited that More than 60% of its military equipment is “outdated”. The Peruvian Army retains the first and second-generation tanks such as T-55 and AMX-13 as its backbone. The plan to refurbish Peru’s main battle tank armada by purchasing 120–170 third-generation main battle tanks is currently on halt. Several tanks have been considered — M1 Abrams, Russian T-90, and Ukrainian T-84 Oplot — but the acquisition comes into hurdles as the recurring political instability in Peru disrupts the decision-making process. The same situation also happened in Ecuador — as the hovering plan to replace the vintage IAI Kfir fighters is still far from substantive talks or approval.
Thus, only Chile and Brazil that has paved a concrete step to strengthen their armed forces. Although a bulk of them are second-hand, including the F-16s from the Netherlands and two ex-Royal Australian Navy Adelaide-class frigates, Chile has one of the most technologically advanced military South American countries. The country has spent US$ 5.55 billion — according to SIPRI (2021) — on weapon purchases between 2000 and 2021. For comparison, Argentina only spent US$ 556 million within the same period, Peru spent US$ 1.8 billion, Ecuador spent US$ 725 million, and Colombia spent US$ 2.69 billion. Only Brazil spent more than Chile in modernising its arsenal, with more than US$ 19,74 billion.
So, how could Chile and Brazil keep their modernisation project in progress? How does the government of both countries prioritise defence modernisation in their green book? What other fundamental factors hurdled the military refurbishment plan in South America apart from the looming financial crisis?
The vision to develop an innovative defence sector should come into first place. So far, only the Chilean and Brazilian Government has taken this vision seriously, as proved by the government’s stance not to neglect the role of armed forces. It mainly resulted from the successful transition between the military junta era and democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. The newly elected governments conducted a series of re-professionalisation within the military. They restored the military’s imperative role as the guardian of national unity and sovereignty, thus improving civil-military relations. The contrary situation happened in Argentina, where the new government gradually disarmed the armed forces as a part of the “democratisation process” within the society — which diminished the strategic capacity of the armed forces.
The strategic vision is derivatively translated into two primary forms: (1) the commitment to spend a substantive amount of the national budget to capitalise on the armed forces; and (2) a formulation of a formal national action defence plan — often called “defence white paper” — that amalgamated the national security overview, economic outlook — including budgetary issues, and the strategic approach to resolve the envisaged problems.
Brasilia has published its Livro Branco da Defesa Nacional — National Defence White Paper — since 2008 and has been updated thrice. The last edition of the white paper came to the public in 2018. This paper clearly endorsed the decision to gradually modernise the Brazilian Armed Forces, including the plan to develop strategic weaponry, such as nuclear submarines and cruise missiles, until the 2030s. On the other hand, although not frequently publishing formal agendas, Santiago prioritised defence modernisation in its budgetary, projecting for the compact yet formidable tech-based armed forces. It started in the first period of the presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006–2010) when Chile bought more than US$ 2,5 billion in weapon systems. Previously, the country was also the first that positively responded to the lift of the advanced military technology transfer moratorium to South America by the US in 2002 by acquiring F-16s.
The implementation of those strategic visions is supported by ample defence agreements regarding acquisition, technological transfer, and joint exercise, particularly with technologically advanced countries. For example, Chile has acquired EL/M 2075 Phalcon, an Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft developed by Israeli Elta Systems. It is also strategically close to the United States, which conducts joint exercises such as UNITAS; and to the United Kingdom and France, where the arms transfer value reached US$ 746 million and US$ 537 billion, respectively, in 20 years. Conversely, Brazil has channelled its strategic vision with numerous powers. Brazil was granted status as a major non-NATO ally by the United States during the Trump Presidency in 2019, partnered with France to develop the nuclear submarine Alvaro Alberto, and collaborated in the technological transfer process with Sweden for the production of the JAS-39 Gripen E/F fighter.
All of those approaches are influenced by the policymaking process of Brazil and Chile. It succeeded due to the awareness of geopolitical risk and dynamics; that is absent within the South American leadership. This negligence of understanding mainly happened due to two main factors: (1) the absence of regional geopolitical dynamics, including the great power intervention, hegemonic rivalry, or arms race; and (2) the prevailing internal instability that happened in the post-dictatorship era of South America, that put the role of the armed forces in the crossroad — whether as a “guarantor of democracy” or a professional force that is maintaining the sovereignty and geopolitical stance that should be “strong enough”. This factor has made the military transformation and modernisation sluggish, amalgamated with the chronic economic uncertainty.
Thus, the future is uncertain for the defence sector in South America. The leaders still face a dilemma, especially in preserving the armed forces’ strategic role, developing a robust yet cost-effective defence partnership and industries, and effectively recovering the economy. As the trend of socialist leadership is reviving in the region, it is necessary to understand how the newly-elected leaders try to hit two birds with a stone: maintain civil-military relations within their countries and arrange a series of defence modernisation policies; while simultaneously upholding the social democratic values.
References
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